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Abstract—Crowd-intelligence tries to gather, process, infer and
ascertain massive useful information by utilizing the intelligence
of crowds or distributed computers, which has great potential in
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). A crowd-intelligence ecosys-
tem involves three stakeholders, namely the platform, workers
(e.g., individuals, sensors or processors), and task publisher. The
stakeholders have no mutual trust but interest conflict, which
means bad cooperation of them. Due to lack of trust, transferring
raw data (e.g., pictures or video clips) between publisher and
workers requires the remote platform center to serve as a relay
node, which implies network congestion. First we use a reward-
penalty model to align the incentives of stakeholders. Then
the predefined rules are implemented using blockchain smart
contract on many edge servers of the mobile edge computing
network, which together function as a trustless hybrid human-
machine crowd-intelligence platform. As edge servers are near
to workers and publisher, network congestion can be effectively
improved. Further, we proved the existence of the only one strong
Nash equilibrium, which can maximize the interests of involved
edge servers and make the ecosystem bigger. Theoretical analysis
and experiments validate the proposed method respectively.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing, blockchain smart con-
tract, crowd-intelligence ecosystem, trustless, hybrid human-
machine, reward and penalty, strong Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
C rowd-intelligence is to gather, process, infer and ascertainmassive useful information by utilizing the intelligence
of crowds or computers, whereby a publisher broadcasts
massive tasks to lots of semi-skilled workers to obtain reliable
answers [1]. It is widely used in knowledge collecting (e.g.
mobile crowdsensing [2]), decision making (e.g., tagging of
machine learning training dataset [3]), etc. Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT) has the properties of high distribution, high-
frequency activity, and is near to massive mobile users, which
makes itself a great potential for crowd-intelligence [4], [5].
The number of tasks to be completed is too large to complete
on time for limited number of professionals, or the tasks are
too difficult to be auto-processed well just by computer pro-
grams [3], [6], [7]. A crowd-intelligence ecosystem involves
three stakeholders, namely platform, workers , and publisher
that can publish tasks to workers.
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Fig. 1: The proposed blockchain-enabled trustless crowd-
intelligence ecosystem. It is decentralized and imple-
ments a blockchain smart contract and operates on edge
servers/blockchain masternodes (ES/MNs) of a mobile edge
computing network. Both human beings and machines can
serve as workers or publishers.
These three stakeholders may have no mutual trust and their
interests conflict with each other [6], [8], [9]. For example,
workers try to get more payment from the publisher with
low quality works. It is not easy to align incentives of stake-
holders so that they may collaborate smoothly. This harms
the long term development of the whole crowd-intelligence
ecosystem, e.g., answers of low quality, unnecessary high
cost paid by publisher to workers, delayed completion of the
tasks (i.e., exceeding the time constraint set by the publisher),
and weakening platform (i.e., loss of professional workers,
and poorly prespared workers flooding into it). Due to the
lack of mutual trust among stakeholders, the raw data for
a task (e.g., pictures or video clips that are published by
the publisher or submitted by workers [2], [10], [3]) cannot
be transferred directly between publisher and workers. The
remote cloud center (RC) of the centralized crowd-intelligence
platform must serve as the third party guarantee and the
intermediary node of the data transferring network path. As
raw data transferring plays a great role in a normal crowd-
intelligence ecosystem, trust problem may result in excess
bandwidth and delayed response [11], [12], [13]. This needs
to be avoided in time critical use cases, e.g., automobile
navigation [10], [14], [15] or disaster recovery [16]. Finally, a
crowd-intelligence ecosystem is short of the available workers
to complete growing number and variety of tasks and this leads
to low quality of final answers and delayed completion of the
complete tasks.
We solve the above-mentioned problems from the following
three aspects, and build them into an integrated method named
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blockchain-enabled trustless crowd-intelligence ecosystem op-
erated on mobile edge computing network (Fig. 1, note that
remote cloud (RC) is not obligatory in general. But without
RC, the proposed decentralized crowd-intelligence network
still works.): i) incentive problem. An incentive-compatible
and efficient incentive model is particularly important for a
decentralized system. We build a reward-penalty model to
align incentives of the three stakeholders. We reward or punish
workers according to the quality of their committed answers
instead of only positive payment [10], [17]. We develop a fam-
ily of appropriate reward-penalty function couples, by which
the amounts of reward and penalty can be computed based
on the workers’ committing beliefs without destroying the
incentive compatibility property of the ecosystem. Different
from a single reward-penalty function couple or rewarding
only, this model provides a more flexible solution to manage
the interests of three stakeholders, and help to reduce latency,
improve quality, and do good to platform evolution of the
crowd-intelligence ecosystem [10], [17]. ii) trust problem.
A worker’s performance history determines the amounts of
her reward/penalty in completing tasks. And the predefined
management rules/cooperation standards define how the plat-
form works. It is of important to avoid malicious activity
or tampering from the bad minorities, and win the trust of
stakeholders. We propose to treat it with blockchain smart
contract. The smart contract is copied to multiple edge servers
(ES) of mobile edge computing and executed. The proposed
crowd-intelligence platform is decentralized using blockchain
technology and is not hosted on a centralized RC. The ESs
are owned by many individuals and behave as blockchain
masternodes (MNs) [18]. Without the agreement of more than
a half MNs, the smart contract cannot be changed arbitrarily
[19]. The stakeholders can collaborate without trusting each
other. Specifically, the raw data transferring between publisher
and workers can proceed with the nearest ES/MNs serving
as intermediary nodes, which can avoid excess bandwidth
and delayed response. The ES/MNs charge a small fees
from the publisher and workers to keep the security state
of the blockchain, and earn money from it [18], [19]. With
the help of blockchain smart contract, the involved ESs
can maximize profits with strong Nash equilibrium [20] and
the proposed ecosystem can attract more ESs to serve as
blockchain masternodes. iii) worker shortage problem. When
the trust problem is solved, a trustless hybrid human-machine
crowd-intelligence platform can be built, where both of human
beings and machines (including sensors or processors) are
able to serve as workers or publishers without mutual trust.
Specifically, human workers perform well in highly complex
tasks (i.e., crowdsourcing [21]), while machine workers can
do better in realtime high-frequency tasks (i.e., crowdsensing
[10]). This platform can also help to solve the worker shortage
problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We introduce
how to align the interests of three involved stakeholders using
the reward and penalty model in Section II. Section III shows
how to build a trustless crowd-intelligence ecosystem using
blockchain smart contract on a mobile edge computing net-
work. In Section IV, we introduce the hybrid human-machine
concept to relieve the worker shortage problem. In Section
V, experiments on two synthetic datasets are conducted to
validate the proposed crowd-intelligence ecosystem, and the
results are supplements to the proof and analysis in the
previous sections. Section VI presents the existing related
works. And Section VII draws conclusions and discusses our
future work.
II. REWARD-PENALTY MODEL
An incentive-compatible and efficient incentive model is
particularly important for a decentralized system. Not like the
traditional centralized crowd-intelligence system, the proposed
decentralized version has no an arbitral authority to settle
the disputes among different stakeholders. If the system is
incentive-compatible, every stakeholder can achieve the best
outcome to themselves just by behaving according to prede-
fined rules, which helps to avoid disputes. If the proposed de-
centralized crowd-intelligence system is efficient, it will have
more advantages over the existing centralized competitors. As
a result, a good incentive model that can achieving the above
targets is needed.
The proposed reward-penalty model does not estimate a
worker’s proficiency or her reliability on each commit. Instead,
it assumes that each worker knows her reliability on a specific
task, and its target is to incentive workers to commit the truth.
If a worker is assigned a task, she is asked to commit both of
task’s type information (i.e. the answer she selected from the
candidates) and belief value (i.e. her confidence that measures
the probability that her selection will be judged right). Only
binary-type task is taken into account here, such that the
number of the task’s candidate answers is uniformly two, like
Yes or No [22], [8], [17]. Belief value is reasonable because
that a worker always intentionally or unintentionally estimates
in her own mind the probability of giving the right answer
when she is encountered with a decision making task due to
tasks’ inherent difficulty, different individual experience and
professional knowledge, etc. [23], [24].
Some symbols and denotations are as follows. The number
of tasks is denoted by T , and there are a total of N workers
to complete these tasks. The index of a task is denoted by an
integer 1 ≤ t ≤ T , and a worker is indexed using an integer
1 ≤ n ≤ N . The binary-type space of tasks is denoted as
{−1,+1}. We use st to denote the worker set that completed
task t. When worker n completes task t, we use an,t to
represent her committing type for this task. The belief value
is in range [0.5, 1], which means that the committed type is
more suitable than the other one. x denotes the committed
belief value x, and the real probability that her committed type
is judged right is denoted by c. When a worker’s committing
type is finally judged correct, her reward amount is denoted
by the reward function of variable x, i.e., reward(x) > 0,
and penalty(x) > 0 is the penalty function if her committing
type is judged as wrong.
The workflow of reward-penalty model is shown in Fig.
2, and it contains three modules, namely Judgement, Final
Generation, and Reward-Penalty:
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Fig. 2: Workflow of the reward-penalty model.
A. Judgement Module
Judgement module uses benchmark answer to judge
whether a work for a task deserves reward or penalty for a
task completion. The benchmark answer for task t is defined
by the following:
ât =sgn
(∑
n∈st
an,t
)
, (1)
where sgn(x) = −1 if x < 0, and 1 otherwise.
Note that benchmark answer ât will not be sent to the
publisher as the final answer of a task. It is just used to judge
whether or not worker n is due for a reward or penalty for her
an,t. Specifically, if an,t equals to ât, the worker will receive
a reward from the publisher, otherwise she will need to pay
to the publisher as a penalty.
B. Reward-Penalty Module
This module computes the how much reward (reward(x))
or penalty (penalty(x)) should be given. In statistical terms,
the type committed by a worker will be judged correct with
probability of c, and occurrence probability of a wrong judge-
ment is the rest 1− c. Therefore the expected gain payment is
defined as:
expected(x) = c · reward(x)− (1− c) · penalty(x). (2)
Due to different individual experiences and professional
knowledge, value c given by different workers may be differ-
ent. Moreover, a specific worker’s c for different tasks changes
according to their respective inherent difficulty.
Then the model is formulated by the following:
argmaxxexpected(x) = c
〈reward, penalty〉 ≥ 0, 〈∂reward∂x , ∂penalty∂x 〉 > 0
reward(0.5) = penalty(0.5) = 0, reward(1) = 1
0.5 ≤ x ≤ 1
(3)
of which the first means that a worker must commit c to
maximize her expected gain, i.e., a worker can get the largest
expected gain payment just only if she chooses to commit the
truth [25], [26]; the second means that the reward and penalty
have a positive correlation with x, a larger belief value of
its corresponding committing type has a larger influence on
the benchmark and final answer of the task, and it may be
beneficial or harmful [23], [24]; the third means the boundary
values, and the fourth means the definitional domain. A fixed
boundary value is to ensure easy solvability of reward-penalty
functions [27]. As a commit with x = 0.5 cannot offer any
useful information, no stakeholder will gain or lose for it.
By solving this model, we successfully find a family of
reward-penalty functions by the following:{
rewardk(x) =
−(k−1)2kxk+2kkxk−1−(k+1)
2k−k−1
penaltyk(x) =
(k−1)2kxk−(k−1)
2k−k−1
, (4)
where k ≥ 2 can be considered as the order of a reward-
penalty function couple and personal order value of the
corresponding worker. Then we can obtain the expected gain
function with k-th order by plugging Eq. 4 into Eq. 2:
expectedk(c) =
2kck − 2 ck + k − 1
2k − k − 1 . (5)
C. Final Generation Module
This module generates the final answer as the final result of
the corresponding task, which is what the publisher wants. The
final answer a∗t for task t can be generated by the following:
a∗t =sgn
(∑
n∈st
expectedn,tan,t
)
. (6)
Compared to benchmark answer in Eq. 1, final answer in
Eq. 6 is more like the weighted majority rule or weighting
aggregation rule that are widely used in crowdsourcing [28].
It can generate the the true answer even if majority workers’
committing types are not right. As a larger belief value means
its corresponding type is more reliable than a smaller one, it
is reasonable to consider workers’ belief value into computing
the final answer.
The expected payment expectedn,t is suitable for the weight
coefficient of committing type: i) it has monotonicity property
in 0.5 ≤ c ≤ 1 for any k ≥ 2, which guarantees a larger
influence of a committing type if it has a higher belief value.
ii) it is a better fit than either one of them in measuring the
reliability of a committing type. iii) it has more distinguishing
ability in comparison to belief value c. iv) the more the
publisher pays, the better quality she gains, which helps to
make the most of publisher’s money.
The reward-penalty model is incentive compatible and effi-
cient, which helps to align stakeholders’ interests, latency, and
quality control: i) the publisher needs to pay only for good
committing answers, and can get some compensation from
the penalty for bad commits. ii) it is easy to design personal
order value into a negative function of a worker’s performance
history. Then a professional worker can gain more than a
badly-behaved worker if they commit the same for a task.
This way model can attract more good workers to the platform.
iii) when a worker feels that the assigned task is very hard,
she can commit with a tiny belief value (i.e., approximating
to 0.5) for a tiny gain, by which difficult tasks will not be left
behind and undue latency would not occur.
The reward-penalty model needs blockchain technology.
i) workers and publishers are the comparatively weak side
against the centralized platform. The proposed reward-penalty
model entitles workers and publishers to exert influence on all
of the three involved stakeholders. This is consistent with the
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Fig. 3: ES/MN nodes and SPV nodes of the crowd-intelligence
ecosystem on mobile edge computing network.
decentralization idea of blockchain and mobile edge comput-
ing. ii) as the reward-penalty model requires workers to deposit
in advance a certain amount of fund to the platform as the pos-
sible the source of penalty, the platform may misuse workers’
money without proper supervision, which is not workers do
not want. Blockchain technology can help to avoid diversion of
fund by decentralizing fund management. In the following, we
will introduce how a crowd-intelligence ecosystem can benefit
from blockchain and mobile edge computing.
III. A TRUSTLESS CROWD-INTELLIGENCE PLATFORM ON
MOBILE EDGE COMPUTING
A. Trustless Platform enabled by Blockchain Smart Contract
and Mobile Edge Computing
The trust problem of a crowd-intelligence ecosystem re-
sults from two ways: i) high centralization. The reward-
penalty model in Section II relies too heavily on the crowd-
intelligence platform in aligning incentives of stakeholders.
A worker’s reward/penalty amounts for task completion is
closely related to her performance history (i.e., order k in
Eq. 4). In addition, the predefined management rules of
the platform and the collaboration standards of stakeholders
define how the ecosystem works. All of these information
and rules are controlled by and stored in a highly centralized
crowd-intelligence platform (a remote cloud center/RC) [2],
[10], which poses the following risks: the platform itself has
the right to tamper them, and natural disaster may damage
them easily [16]. Without solving the risks brought by the
centralized platform, the crowd-intelligence ecosystem cannot
win the trust of other stakeholders. ii) competing interest.
Interest conflict of stakeholders leads to lack of mutual trust
[6], [8], [9]. So data for a crowd-intelligence task cannot be
transferred directly between publisher and workers. A less-
than-ideal alternative is to invite RC of the centralized crowd-
intelligence platform to serve as the third party guarantee and
the intermediary node of the data transferring network path.
This increases the bandwidth overburden and response time
[11], [12], [13], as raw data transferring plays a great role in
a normal IIoT or crowd-intelligence ecosystem, where pictures
or video clips are published by the publisher or submitted by
workers [2], [10], [3], [16].
We propose to use blockchain smart contract to implement
the reward-penalty model, workers’ performance history data,
and the predefined management rules of the platform and the
collaboration standards, which can reduce the risks due to a
centralized platform; we propose to use many edge servers
(ES) of mobile edge computing as blockchain masternodes to
host and run the smart contract, which can relieve network
congestion. We present details in two steps: i) new activities
among stakeholders will be recorded and packed into a newly
created data block at set intervals. A new block has a pointer
to the unique hash code of its previous block, and all blocks
form a chain, which is called blockchain. It is scarcely possible
to tamper or damage a blockchain. As a result, if some
information has been stored on blockchain, everyone can trust
it [29]. Blockchain smart contract is a piece of computer
program that is owned by all blockchain nodes, and it cannot
be changed arbitrarily without the consensus of majority of
nodes [19]. What we should implement using blockchain
smart contract includes the reward-penalty model, workers’
performance history data, the predefined management rules of
the platform, and the collaboration standards of stakeholders.
When the presupposed condition is met, the agreed steps
will proceed automatically. In this way, a centralized crowd-
intelligence ecosystem is transformed into a decentralized one
that is operated on a blockchain network, and it can have
the trust of all stakeholders. ii) the blockchain’s consensus
algorithm is designed to rely on a certain range of memory and
bandwidth, which limits the corresponding mining hardware
on edge servers (ES) or some other computing devices at edge
network like that [30], [19]. This design can make the ecosys-
tem distribute wider, and fit into mobile edge computing.
These hardwares store an exact replica of the blockchain, and
we can call them masternodes (MNs). To relieve bandwidth
overburden and response delay, the nearest ES/MN is able to
replace a RC to serve as an intermediary node and third party
guarantee during a raw data transfer between a worker and
publisher. As most of workers and publishers have limited
hardware resources (e.g., mobile phones and sensors), they
need only be a node of simplified payment verification (SPV
node)1, and do not have to host a full replica of the blockchain
like ES/MNs. In addition, as a ES/MN can be in close
proximity to workers/publishers than the RC, it can help them
preprocess the task data at edge network (e.g., videos clips
or images). This can further relieve network congestion, and
increase the system’s ability to respond to massive tasks [16],
[31]. The relationship of ES/MN node and SPV node is shown
in Fig 3.
The reasons that the proposed blockchain is deployed on
edge servers are two: i) a ES/MN should have enough stor-
age resource to host the block data of the blockchain. In
addition, it should have enough computation resource (e.g.,
CPU, GPU,etc.) to provide services to workers and publishers.
What is more, as ES/MNs need to communicate with each
other, network bandwidth is also needed. The demand of
storage/computation/network resources decides that ES/MN
should be at least a small datacenter. ii) for a ES/MN, to save
cost and enhance its competitiveness against other ES/MNs, it
should be near to workers or potential worker. That is to say,
ES/MNs should be deployed near to people. As a result, the
1https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Simplified Payment Verification
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TABLE I: PAYOFF MATRIX FOR TWO ESS IN A TRA-
DITIONAL CROWD-INTELLIGENCE ECOSYSTEM WITHOUT
BLOCKCHAIN SMART CONTRACT.
ES #B
join leave
#A
join b+ d
a+ c
b+ d+ α
a+ c− α
E
S
leave b+ d− β
a+ c+ β
b
a
* 0 < α ≤ c ∧ 0 < β ≤ d.
ideal place for the proposed system is edge server.
B. Incentives for collaboration between ES/MNs
The set of ES/MNs play a key role in the proposed trustless
ecosystem. Many ES/MNs together function as a decentral-
ized crowd-intelligence platform, and regulate and guide the
behaviors of involved stakeholders. Beyond that, with the help
of blockchain smart contract, the other stakeholders can trust
the platform and collaborate with each other, and the network
congestion resulted by transferring data among stakeholders
can be relieved. What is more, if the number of ES/MNs
increases, all stakeholders in the ecosystem can benefit more.
Specifically, i) as ES/MN network covers more and more geo-
graphical areas, more workers/publishers will be able to access
the crowd-intelligence services through the ES/MNs around
them, especially the people in remote rural areas with poor
and expensive network service. ii) as the deployment density
of ES/MNs in one region grows, workers/publishers will have
more choices for data preprocessing and intermediary nodes
for transferring data. iii) a large ES/MN network can generate
a fully competitive market environment, which can reduce the
maintenance cost of the crowd-intelligence ecosystem.
We now show why the proposed trustless crowd-intelligence
ecosystem can attract more edge servers (ES) to serve as
masternodes (MN) in it, and how the involved ES/MNs can
maximize their profits with the help of blockchain smart
contract [20]. As is shown in Fig. 1, a ES at edge network
can be considered as a very small cloud with limited resources
(e.g., CPU, memory, bandwidth, etc.), while the RC at the core
network will not encounter resource shortage problem [31]. If
too many mobile workers gather around an ES/MN at some
point, the resources of the ES will not meet the demands of
these workers and the corresponding ES must buy resources
from nearby ESs or the RC [32], [33]. In this process two
kinds of trust problems arise: i) no mutual trust between two
ESs can ensure a resource trading, unless they find a RC as
the third-party guarantee [34], [31]. ii) ESs are not willing to
trust the RC as the RC can provide its own resources to ESs.
If the RC has dominated the resource market, it will leverage
its status of the intermediary to squeeze ESs out.
The following section expresses our views: First we intro-
duce the prisoner’s dilemma without blockchain smart contract
on a traditional crowd-intelligence platform, which is why it
can not attract more ESs and make the ecosystem grow bigger
[34], [31]. We suppose all ESs are rational economic man, and
the game is played as follows: if both of two ESs #A and #B
TABLE II: PAYOFF MATRIX FOR TWO ESS OF THE PROPOSED
TRUSTLESS CROWD-INTELLIGENCE ECOSYSTEM.
ES #B
join leave
#A
join b+ d
a+ c
b+ d− 2
a+ c− 2
E
S
leave b+ d− 1
a+ c− 1
b
a
* 1, 2 < c, d ∧ 0 < 1, 2  c+ d ∧ 1, 2 < α, β.
choose to leave the ecosystem and trade resources with the
RC, they will gain a and b respectively; if they choose to
join and trade with each other, the transferring distance of the
traded resources between two neighboring ESs is much less
than that between ESs and the RC. As a result, both of ESs #A
and #B can gain more than before; if one choose to join while
the other choose to leave, the former must give more profit to
the latter to keep it inside the ecosystem. The payoff matrix
of this game is shown in Table I. The dominant strategy for
both involved ESs is to leave the ecosystem, which is the only
strong Nash equilibrium. However, both of them gain the least
(i.e., a and b). So a traditional crowd-intelligence platform is
absolutely a prisoner’s dilemma for ESs. ESs of mobile edge
computing have no incentives to join the ecosystem.
We show how we break through the prisoner’s dilemma
using blockchain smart contract, and incentive ESs to join
the ecosystem as MNs. The emphasis is to help ESs in this
ecosystem to get rid of the RC, and form an autonomous com-
munity. In the proposed trustless crowd-intelligence ecosys-
tem, first all trading related information and rules are stored
with blockchain smart contract. During a resource trading,
both of the corresponding two ESs must follow these already
recognized rules. So ESs can buy or sell resources with others
without mutual trust or third-party guarantee. Table II shows
the payoff matrix for two ESs of the proposed trustless crowd-
intelligence ecosystem. The difference of payoff matrix in
Table II from that in Table I are the payoff values for two
ESs’ different choices. Specifically, the two ESs can trust the
blockchain smart contract as a third party guarantee, and trade
resources under the guidance of the blockchain smart contract
without trusting each other. In this case, the blockchain smart
contract helps to match the most suitable seller/buyer. In
return, the blockchain smart contract platform will charge
small fees from two ES/MNs to keep the blockchain running
(i.e., 1, 2 in the payoff matrix). We can see that joining is
the dominant strategy for both of the two involved ESs, which
is the only strong Nash equilibrium of the game. That means
the ESs can maximize their profits and have enough incentives
to join the proposed trustless crowd-intelligence ecosystem to
serve as MNs.
The root cause of trading resources between ES/MNs is
to reduce cost. When two MN/ES cannot match each other,
it means that they cannot reach consensus over the price of
resources. When two ES/MN cannot reach consensus over
the price, it means that the buyer cannot reduce cost by buy
resources from others. Then it will process the work by itself,
and cannot provide more services before this ES/MN can free
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more resources.
C. Brokerage from the publisher to ES/MNs
ES/MNs will not offer services (including collaboration
between ES/MNs) to workers and publishers for free. Someone
should pay for it. In this work, the publisher should pay
brokerage to its directly connected ES/MNs. The brokerage
model is as follows: i) the publisher give the brokerage ratio
η when she publish the tasks. If a ES/MN accepts the ratio,
it will join in to provide crowd-intelligence services. ii) when
the publisher pays reward r to a worker for completing as task,
it also pays ηr brokerage to all of ES/MNs that have provide
services for completing this task, and the brokerage is equally
distributed between these ES/MNs. iii) if the worker should
pay penalty p back to the publisher for this task, the ES/MNs
associated with this task have to share ηp penalty.
For a ES/MN, the money it has received minus the money
it has paid out is its net remuneration. Every ES/MN has full
responsibility for its own profit and loss. The brokerage model
has no impact on the incentive compatibility of the reward-
penalty model. So as long as the workers has positive overall
expected gain, the ES/MN will have positive net remuneration.
It is no need to build a completely new blockchain for
this work. A complete new blockchain that can fit crowd-
intelligence is the best. With the tailor-made transaction struc-
ture and smartcontract, the system would be simple and easy
to use. However, a complete new blockchain is not needed.
The core use of Blockchain in this work is to provide trust by
store some information into blockchain. As a result, we can
build an application layer on one of the existing blockchain
platform (e.g., Bitcoin or Ethernum), which stores information
into the third-part blockchain, and uses this information to
provide crowd-intelligence service.
IV. HYBRID HUMAN-MACHINE WORKERS
A crowd-intelligence platform needs to attract machines
like sensors and processors in addition to human beings as
its workers, and develop itself into a hybrid human-machine
ecosystem: i) integrating advantages both of human beings and
machines. Specifically, the crowd-intelligence platform can
assign human workers more highly complex crowdsourcing
tasks, e.g., labeling of training dataset in machine learning
[3], [21]; and assign machine workers more realtime frequent
crowdsensing tasks, e.g., mobile crowdsensing in IIoT [4],
automobile navigation [10]). The proposed platform is able
to cover both crowdsourcing and crowdsensing. ii) relieving
the worker shortage problem and reducing excessive latency
of the whole tasks. As more workers can complete more tasks
within the same time period, excessive latency of the whole
tasks is hard to occur if only human workers are used. The
hybrid human-machine crowd-intelligence is shown in Fig. 4.
The enabling technology of the proposed hybrid human-
machine crowd-intelligence platform is blockchain smart con-
tract. The blockchain smart contract is responsible to guide and
monitor the behaviors of workers, and prevent frauds among
them. So from a management perspective of the decentralized
crowd-intelligence platform, human beings and machines are
Crowdsensing
Crowdsourcing
Hybrid Human-Machine
 Crowd-intelligence
Human Beings 
Workers
Machine Workers
SPV nodes
Worker shortage problem
/ Excessive latency control
Fig. 4: Crowd-intelligence platform with hybrid human-
machine workers.
just indiscriminate workers represented by SPV nodes. All
kinds of computing devices, especially AI devices like in-home
routers, monitoring camera and mobile phones at edge network
can work as machine workers [35]. With the blockchain smart
contract, these machine workers can use the earnings to pay
for their continued existence, e.g., hardware resources, access
to more useful information and software improvements in their
whole life cycle without human intervention.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Settings
We use BeTrustMEC to represent the proposed blockchain-
enabled trustless crowd-intelligence ecosystem. There are two
baselines, namely Major-CI and ReNalty-CI:
• Major-CI: It is widely used in current crowdsourcing
platforms like MTurk and FigureEight, where the type
selected by the largest number of workers is determined
as the final answer. Major-CI is totally centralized in that
data transferring between a publisher and workers must
go through the remote platform center on a RC.
• ReNalty-CI: The only difference of ReNalty-CI from
Major-CI is that it uses the reward-penalty model to align
incentives of stakeholders and obtain the final answer.
ReNalty-CI gives publishers and workers more rights to
influence the ecosystem. Like Major-CI, publishers and
workers of ReNalty-CI have no mutual trust.
As no specific off-the-shelf dataset exists, we choose to
generate two pieces of synthesized datasets to validate the
proposed ecosystem. Fig. 5a shows the spatial distribution
of 3, 234 cellular base stations in Shanghai of China. The
cellular distribution is unbalanced and is consistent with the
distribution of crowd-intelligence tasks. In experiments of two
baselines, the RC is located at the same location, where the
cellular base station distribution has the highest density in Fig.
5a. Another dataset is as shown in Fig. 5b, which shows the
distribution of 967 cellular base stations in Beijing of China.
Based on the base station distribution data, the three
stakeholders (i.e., publisher, worker, and ES/MN) and crowd-
sourcing tasks for the proposed BeTrustMEC are generated
according to the following way: i) we normalize the distances
between two base stations to range (0, 1], and consider the
normalized distances as the corresponding network latency
between the two locations. ii) 5 base stations are randomly
selected as publishers, and each has 2000 tasks to publish.
iii) 100 workers are selected from remaining base stations to
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(a) Shanghai city of China.
(b) Beijing city of China.
Fig. 5: Spatial distribution heatmap of cellular base stations.
complete these tasks. iv) 20 ES/MNs are randomly selected
from the rest base stations. In the simulation of BeTrustMEC,
when a worker receives data from or submits data to a
publisher, they will choose the ES/MN with least sum of
distances to them to transfer the data without trust. In this
way, a decentralized crowd-intelligence ecosystem that covers
the whole city is constructed.
Different from the proposed BeTrustMEC, baselines Major-
CI and ReNalty-CI are essentially traditional centralized
crowdsourcing systems, which have only one remote crowd-
sourcing platform on a RC instead of decentralized ES/MNs.
The location of the remote platform is determined each time
according to the following way: i) we compute the sum
distance of each base station to the rest base stations, and select
the least 20 of them as the set of candidate platform locations.
This is quite different from site selection in practical cloud
computing industry, where a data center is always located
far from downtown due to operating costs [36]. We make
this change here to make the baselines to generate the best
performance, especially in latency time of completing the
whole tasks, which in turn validates the effectiveness of the
proposed BeTrustMEC in the subsequent experimental resutls.
ii) we select one from the set of candidate platform locations
as the location of the platform each time. This step adds
uncertainty to the location selection, which is just like the
selection of the set of ES/MNs for BeTrustMEC.
Now we introduce the way to generate crowd-intelligence
tasks and commits of workers. A task is generated as follows:
i) the real type value y0 of a task takes +1/-1 at the same
probability. ii) the real belief value c0 of the tasks is uniformly
distributed in range (0.5, 1]. A worker is supposed to have a
bias value b ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] towards c0, and her commit for a
task with c0 is generated as follows: i) if c0 + b < 0.5, she
commits the wrong type with belief value 1 − c0 − b. ii) if
c0 + b > 1, she commits the right type with belief value 1.
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Fig. 7: Experimental results on data of Shanghai base stations.
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Fig. 8: Experimental results on data of Beijing base stations.
iii) else, she commits the right type with belief value c0 + b.
In addition, a worker cannot process two tasks at a time and
a task cannot be processed more than once by one worker.
When a task obtains three commits, its benchmark and final
answers are generated and this task is considered complete.
B. Experimental Results
Fig. 6 shows curves of the expected gain payment that
workers gain with different belief values of commits. As both
of ReNalty and the proposed BeTrustMEC use the reward-
penalty model, they are represented by the same curves. The
parameter k means workers’ personal order value. Belief value
is not needed in Major-CI. However, it still affects the accuracy
of a worker’s committing answer and her expected gain. A
larger committing belief value can gain more in BeTrustMEC
or ReNalty-CI than Major-CI, while a less committing belief
results in the opposite. As personal order increases, this trend
becomes more evident. So the ReNalty and the proposed
BeTrustMEC can attract more professional workers.
Experimental results on data of Shanghai base stations is
shown in Fig. 7. Fig. 7a shows that BeTrustMEC performs
much better than Major-CI and ReNalty-CI on latency control,
which means that tasks published by BeTrustMEC can be
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completed in much less time. The reason is that BeTrustMEC
is a decentralized ecosystem where workers and publishers
can transfer data using the nearby ES/MNs instead of remote
cloud center. What is more, BeTrustMEC has lower variance
value than baselines, which means its decentralization helps to
suppress latency fluctuation. Fig. 7b shows that BeTrustMEC
performs better than Major-CI in accuracy of final answers.
ReNalty-CI has similar accuracy to BeTrustMEC, which is
because of the same reward-penalty model is used. But
ReNalty-CI has much worse variance, which may result from
the location uncertainty of the remote platform.
Experimental results on data of Beijing base stations are
shown in Fig. 8. The results are very similar to that in Fig.
7. Fig. 8a shows that the proposed BeTrust-MEC performs
much better than both of Major-CI and ReNalty-CI. on latency
control. While in respect to accuracy of final answers, Fig. 8b
shows that BeTrustMEC performs better than Major-CI, and
similar to ReNalty-CI.
As we can see from the experimental results, BeTrustMEC
performs better than the two baselines in general, which
together with the previous theoretical analysis helps to validate
the effectiveness of the proposed BeTrustMEC.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Past works cannot fit the decentralization features of mobile
edge computing, and meet the differentiated demands of a
crowd-intelligence ecosystem [1], [3], [17], [10], [8]. For
example, workers’ reliability must be inferred from workers’
history records [1], [3], and at the same time much money is
wasted for bad workers and no penalty for their bad affects
as compensation is paid to the task publisher [17], [10].
The reward-penalty model gives a much more flexible way
to manage the interests of three stakeholders. The incentive
system in crowd-intelligence platform, like the reward-penalty
model, is complex enough, and easy to be tampered by bad
minorities, which results in trust problem.
In this paper, the trust problem among crowd-intelligence
stakeholders is solved by integrating mobile edge computing
and blockchain smart contract together. The past works mainly
focus on how to identify the trustworthiness of workers or their
commits [1], [3], [17], [10], but ignore how to ensure the trust-
worthness of publishers and the crowd-intelligence platform,
which is unfair to the workers. We are the first to discussed
the trust problem among the edge servers/masternodes of the
decentralized crowd-intelligence platform based on blockchain
smart contract. Satyanarayanan et al. [31] mentioned the
relationship between edge servers and remote cloud, but not
studied how edge servers compete with remote cloud in
providing edge services, and how they can collaborate with
each other without mutual trust.
The past crowdsourcing [21] mainly focuses on dealing
with highly complex tasks (e.g., labeling of training dataset
in machine learning [3]) using human beings workers, while
crowdsensing mainly deals with realtime frequent tasks us-
ing sensors or other computing devices. As crowdsourcing
and crowdsensing use quite different workers, it is not easy
to integrate the two in order to obtain the advantages of
both. While by using blockchain smart contract, the proposed
hybrid human-machine platform can consider human beings
and machines as indiscriminate workers, which can expand
the applications of crowd-intelligence to crowdsourcing and
crowdsensing. As human beings and machine workers can
complement each other, the hybrid human-machine platform
can help to reduce excessive latency of the whole tasks.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a trustless crowd-intelligence ecosystem
based on the common decentralization feature of mobile
edge computing and blockchain technology. Its reward-penalty
model provides a flexible way to align the interests of three
stakeholders. It expands the applications of crowd-intelligence
to crowdsourcing and crowdsensing domains. What is more, it
can make use both of human beings and machines as workers
to solve the worker shortage problem. It can offer many data-
related solutions to Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), and
benefit from the IIoT’s infrastructures at the same time. For
future work, we plan to i) implement the proposed ecosystem
using blockchain technology and deploy it in a real mobile
edge computing network for more test and promotion; and
ii) further make it work within limited total budget.
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